A new recursive regression methodology is introduced to analyze the bubble characteristics of various …nancial time series during the subprime crisis. The methods modify a technique proposed in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2010) and provide a technology for identifying bubble behavior and consistent dating of their origination and collapse. The tests also serve as an early warning diagnostic of bubble activity. Seven relevant …nancial series are investigated, including three …nancial assets (the Nasdaq index, home price index and asset-backed commercial paper), two commodities (the crude oil price and platinum price), one bond rate (Baa), and one exchange rate (Pound/USD). Statistically signi…cant bubble characteristics are found in all of these series. The empirical estimates of the origination and collapse dates suggest an interesting migration mechanism among the …nancial variables: a bubble …rst emerged in the equity market during mid-1995 lasting to the end of 2000, followed by a bubble in the real estate market between January 2001 and July 2007 and in the mortgage market between November 2005 and August 2007. After the subprime crisis erupted, the phenomenon migrated selectively into the commodity market and the foreign exchange market, creating bubbles which subsequently burst at the end of 2008, just as the e¤ects on the real economy and economic growth became manifest. Our empirical estimates of the origination and collapse dates match well with the general datetimes of this crisis put forward in a recent study by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008).
Introduction
Financial bubbles have been a longstanding topic of interest for economists, involving both theorists and empirical researchers. Some of the main issues have focused on mechanisms for modeling bubbles, reconciling bubble-like behavior in the context of rational expectations of future earnings, mechanisms for detecting bubbles, and measuring their extent, exploring causes and the psychology of investor behavior, and considering suitable policy responses. While there is general agreement that …nancial bubbles give rise to misallocation of resources and can have serious e¤ects on real economic activity, as yet there has been little consensus among economists and policy makers on how to address the many issues raised above.
The global …nancial turmoil over 2008-2009, triggered by the subprime crisis in the US and its subsequent e¤ect on commodity markets, exchange rates and real economic activity, has led to renewed interest among economists in …nancial bubbles and their potential global consequences. There is now widespread recognition among policy makers as well as economists that changes in the global economy over the last decade, far from decoupling economic activity as was earlier believed, have led to powerful latent …nancial linkages that have increased risks in the event of a large common shock. The magnitude of the crisis is so large, the mechanism so complex, and the consequences so important to the real economy that understanding the phenomena, exploring its causes and mapping its evolution have presented major challenges to the economics profession. As the headers that lead this article indicate, a substantial percentage of the world's accrued wealth has been destroyed within 18 months of the subprime crisis with manifold e¤ects ranging from the collapse of major …nancial institutions to the near bankruptcy of national economies. There is also recognition that new empirical methods are needed to improve understanding of speculative phenomena and to provide early warning diagnostics of The recent background of …nancial exuberance and collapse with concatenating e¤ects across markets and nations provides a rich new environment for empirical research. The most urgent ongoing questions relate to matters of …scal, monetary, and regulatory policies for securing …nancial stability and buttressing real economic activity. In this regard, there have been serious disagreements among economists and policy makers about the e¤ectiveness and consequences of various bailout and recovery plans proposed by North American, European and Asian governments to deal with the …nancial crisis. Beyond these immediate policy issues are underlying questions relating to the emergence of the phenomena and its evolutionary course through the …nancial and economic systems. It is these latter issues that form the focus of interest of the present paper.
The subprime crisis is not an isolated empirical event. In a recent article, Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008a, CFG hereafter) argued that the Internet bubble in the 1990s, the asset bubbles over [2005] [2006] , the subprime crisis in 2007, and the commodity bubbles of 2008 are all closely related. Similar views of the interconnectedness of the crisis phenomena are held by most economists and media commentators and this interpretation is also generally supported by the timeline in which the various crisis events have unfolded. CFG go further and put forward a sequential hypothesis concerning bubble creation and collapse that accounts for the course of the …nancial turmoil in the U.S. economy using a simple general equilibrium model without monetary factors but with goods that may be partially securitized. Date stamping the timeline of the origination and collapse of the various bubbles is a critical element in the validity of this sequential hypothesis.
The present paper uses new econometric methodology to test if and when bubbles emerged and collapsed in the stock market, the real estate market, the mortgage market, the commodity market, and the foreign exchange market over the period surrounding the subprime crisis.
Many series are studied. In particular, we investigate the bubble characteristics in the Nasdaq Pound/USD exchange rates over March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009 show the time series plot of the …rst three, next two, and last two series, respectively. Our methods enable us to determine whether a bubble emerged in each series, date stamp the origination in that event, and correspondingly assess whether the bubble collapsed and the date of that collapse.
The empirical date stamps so determined are then matched against the hypothesized sequence of events described in the model of CFG.
The econometric methods used here are closely related to those proposed in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2009, PWY hereafter) . In particular, the methods rely on forward recursive regressions coupled with sequential right-sided unit root tests. The sequential tests assess period by period evidence for unit root behavior against mildly explosive alternatives. Mildly explosive behavior may be modeled by an autoregressive process with a root ( ) that exceeds unity but that is still in the general vicinity of unity. Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, 2007b, PM hereafter) show that this 'mildly explosive'vicinity of unity can be successfully modeled in terms of deviations of the form 1 = c=k n > 0, where c is a positive constant and k n is a sequence that passes to in…nity with, but more slowly than, the sample size n; so that ! 1: These processes therefore involve only mild departures from strict (rational) martingale behavior in markets.
They include submartingale processes of the type that have been used to model rational bubble behavior in …nance (Evans, 1991; Campbell, Lo and McKinley, 1998) . PM (2007a PM ( , 2007b have investigated this class of process, developed a large sample asymptotic theory, and shown that these models are amenable to econometric inference, unlike purely explosive processes for which no central limit theory is applicable. An important di¤erence between the methods proposed in the current paper and those in PWY lies in the manner in which the initialization is handled.
In PWY, the initial condition is …xed to be the …rst observation in the full sample whereas in the current paper the initial observation is selected based on an information criterion. The use of information criteria in the selection of the the initial observation allows for sharper identi…cation of the bubble origination date.
PWY applied forward recursive regression methods to Nasdaq stock prices during the 1990s, and using sequential tests against mildly explosive alternatives were able to date-stamp the origination of …nancial exuberance in the Nasdaq market to mid-1995, prior to the famous remark of Alan Greenspan in December 1996 about irrational exuberance in …nancial markets.
This test therefore revealed that there was anticipatory empirical evidence supporting mildly explosive behavior in stock prices over a year prior to Greenspan's remarks. In ongoing work, Phillips and Yu (2009) have developed a limit theory for this date stamping technology and checked the …nite sample capability of this procedure to identify and date bubble behavior.
The date stamp estimators were shown to be consistent for the origination and collapse of bubble behavior and the dating mechanism was shown to work well in …nite samples.
The present paper uses this methodology to explore the sequential pattern of events of the current …nancial crisis. Dating helps to characterize the phenomena by identifying the individual events and by …xing their extent and sequencing. It may be viewed as a …rst step in understanding the phenomena and in searching for causes of the behavioral changes involved in bubble origination and collapse. Date stamping also assists in evaluating hypotheses about the concatenation of bubble activity over time and across markets, such as those developed in CFG. The forward recursive regression approach used here enables early identi…cation of the appearance of mildly explosive behavior in asset prices, thereby providing anticipatory evidence of a (local) move away from martingale behavior. This evidence may be used as an early warning diagnostic of (…nancial) exuberance and thereby assist policy makers in surveillance and regulatory actions, as urged by Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn in the header of this article.
Similarly, the approach helps to identify a subsequent switch back to martingale behavior as explosive sentiment collapses.
Empirical evidence of emergent mildly explosive behavior is found in many of the time series studied here, and in all of the series (except for the Pound/USD exchange rate) manifesting mildly explosive behavior there is further evidence of subsequent collapse. Figs. 1-3 show the origination and collapse dates for the bubbles identi…ed in the seven …nancial time series mentioned earlier. For the three series depicted in Fig. 1 , the bubbles emerged and collapsed prior to the subprime crisis. For the two series depicted in Fig. 2 and the two series depicted in Fig. 3 , the bubbles all emerged after the subprime crisis. These …ndings reveal a sequence of mildly explosive events each followed by a …nancial collapse that corroborates the sequential hypothesis given in CFG. Consideration of a wider group of related …nancial series following the eruption of the subprime crisis indicates that bubbles of the type found in the series in
Figs. 2-3 are not always evident in other commodities or currencies. Accordingly, the empirical evidence supports a selective migration of the bubble activity through …nancial markets as the subprime crisis evolved and liquid funds searched for safe havens.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the econometric methodology for dating bubble characteristics, discusses rational bubble and variable discount rate sources of …nancial exuberance, outlines some of the relevant facts concerning the subprime crisis, and relates the timeline implications of the theoretical results obtained in CFG (2008a) . Section 3 describes the data that is used in the present empirical study. Section 4 presents the empirical …ndings and matches the estimates to the theory of CFG (2008a). Section 5 concludes.
2 Bubbles, the Subprime Crisis, and Econometric Dating
Bubbles and Crashes
In the popular press, the term "…nancial bubble" refers to a situation where the price of a …nancial asset rapidly increases and does so in a speculative manner that is distinct from what is considered to be the asset's intrinsic value. The term carries the innuendo that the increase is not justi…ed by economic fundamentals and that there is, accordingly, risk of a subsequent collapse in which the asset price falls precipitously. In such cases, the bubble phenomenon is typically con…rmed in retrospect.
A common de…nition that makes this usage precise is that bubble conditions arise when the price of an asset signi…cantly exceeds the fundamental value that is determined by the discounted expected value of the cash ‡ows that ownership of the asset can generate. However, discount rates may be variable and, as demonstrated below, the time pro…le of the discount rate can have important e¤ects on the characteristics of the fundamental price and may even propagate explosive price behavior.
An important secondary characteristic of the bubble phenomenon is that during both the run up and run down periods the asset is subject to high volume trading in which the direction of change is widely anticipated (and relied upon), as distinct from normal market conditions in which the asset price follows a near martingale. It is this deviation from martingale behavior that provides a mechanism for identifying both the emergence of the boom phase of a bubble behavior and its subsequent crash.
This distinction is recognized in the rational bubble literature, which characterizes the boom phase of a bubble in terms of explosive dynamics or submartingale behavior. This property contrasts with the e¢ cient market martingale property, which implies unit root time series dynamic behavior. To explain the di¤erence in terms of the commonly used present value model, let P t be the stock price at time t before the dividend payout, D t be the dividend payo¤ from the asset at time t, and r be the discount rate (r > 0). The standard no arbitrage condition implies that
and recursive substitution yields
where
Hence, the asset price is decomposed into two components, a "fundamental" component,
that is determined by expected future dividends, and a supplementary solution corresponding to the "bubble" component, B t : In the absence of bubble conditions, P t = F t . Otherwise, Ang and Bekaert (2006) . At longer horizons, explosiveness is subject to collapse, generating a (long run) martingale like feature in the price and making returns more di¢ cult to predict. This latter …nding is also empirically documented in Ang and Bekaert (2006) .
Importantly, making the discount factor r t either stationary or integrated of order one does not change qualitatively our analysis because the implications for the statistical properties of F t ; B t and P t are the same as with the constant r. For example, if r t is stationary, (3) becomes
Then, if (3) is …tted, r = T t=1 (1 + r t ) 1=T > 1, implying an explosive process for B t and hence P t ; even if F t itself is not explosive.
The E¤ects of a Time Varying Discount Rate
This paper interprets explosiveness in price as su¢ cient evidence for bubbles and this interpretation holds true under a varieties of assumptions on the discount rate. As indicated above, certain time pro…les for the discount rate can have an important e¤ect on the characteristics of the fundamental price. The present section illustrates this possibility by developing a simple propagating mechanism for explosive behavior in the fundamental price under a time varying discount rate.
If dividends grow at a constant rate r D with r D < r in (1), 1 the fundamental value of the stock price
This is the well-known Gordon growth model. It is evident that in this case the fundamental value can be very sensitive to changes in r when r is close to r D . In fact, the fundamental value diverges as r & r D ; so that a price run-up is evidently possible under certain time pro…les for the discount rate. This simple Gordon model reveals the potential impact of a time varying discount rate, but it provides no price dynamics. The following argument provides an analytic formulation that shows how an explosive time path in fundamental values can be generated by time variation in the discount rate.
Consider a continuous time version of (5) with time varying discount rate r t , viz.,
Suppose dividends have a constant expected growth rate r D such that
and then D t is a martingale when r D = 0. Combining (6) and (7)
Given some …xed time point t b ; constants c a > 0 and 1 > 2 > 0; let the time pro…le of the discount rate r t+s for t 2 (0; t b ] be as follows:
Then, the discount rate decreases towards some level r D + 1 t b t as t + s % t b and jumps to the level r D + c a + 2 t b t immediately thereafter, as shown in Fig. 4 . Thus, the time pro…le of the discount factor has a structural break at t b in which a higher rate of discounting occurs at t b :
The break itself widens asymptotically as t % t b : (9) We then have
and the time path of F t =D t is explosive over t 2 (0; t b ]: Over this interval, F t evolves according to the di¤erential equation
Since c a F t =D t = e 1 + e 2 e 1 e ca(t b t) ; we have dF t = e 2 e 1 e ca(t b t) e 1 + (e 2 e 1 ) e ca(t b t) c a F t dt + t dD t ; for t 2 (0; t b ]:
For t close to t b the generating mechanism for F t is approximately
which is an explosive di¤usion because
since c a > 0 and e ( 1 2 ) < 1: The discrete time path of F t in this neighbourhood is therefore propagated by an explosive autoregressive process with coe¢ cient = e c b > 1:
The heuristic explanation of this behavior is as follows. As t % t b there is growing anticipation that the discount factor will soon increase. Under such conditions, investors anticipate the present to become more important in valuing assets. This anticipation in turn leads to an in ‡ation of current valuations and price fundamentals F t become explosive as this process continues.
On the other hand, for t > t b we have
and then
ca D t for t > t b and price fundamentals are collinear with D t : When D t is a Brownian motion or an integrated process in discrete time, F t and D t are cointegrated. Thus, after time t b ; price fundamentals comove with D t :
It follows that the time pro…le (9) for the discount rate r t induces a subinterval of explosive behavior in F t before t b : In this deterministic setting, it is known as time t b approaches that there will be an upwards shift in the discount factor that makes present valuations more important. A more realistic model might allow for uncertainty in this time pro…le and a stochastic trajectory for r t that accommodated potential upwards shifts of this type.
Econometric dating procedures of the type described below may be used to assess evidence for subperiods of explosive price behavior that are induced by such time variation in the discount factor, just as for other potential sources of …nancial exuberance.
Subprime Crisis and Event Timeline
The subprime mortgage crisis is generally regarded as an important triggering element in the ongoing global …nancial crisis. The subprime event began with a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures starting in late 2006 in the US, as easy initial adjustment rate mortgage terms began to expire and re…nancing became more di¢ cult at the same time as house prices were falling. The event had wider and, soon, global consequences because of the huge scale of mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the …nancial system, extending the impact of mortgage failure to the asset positions of investment and commercial banks. The crisis became apparent in the last week of July 2007 when German bank regulators and government o¢ cials organized a $5 billion bail out of IKB, a small bank in Germany. We may therefore treat the beginning of August 2007 as the public onset date of the subprime crisis, although the realities in terms of rising mortgage delinquencies commenced earlier.
Much has already been written about the causes of this crisis and a host of factors have been suggested, including poor appreciation of the risks associated with MBS, weak underwriting standards and risk assessment practices in general, increasingly complex …nancial products, high levels of …nancial leverage with associated vulnerabilities, shortfalls in understanding the impact of large common shocks on the …nancial system, and inadequate monitoring by policy makers and regulators of the accumulating risk exposure in the …nancial markets. We refer readers to Brunnermeier (2008) , Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) and Hull (2008) for detailed discussions of the subprime crisis and its manifold implications. Our concern in the present paper is with the crisis timeline and, more speci…cally, the issues of empirically dating the origination and collapse of the various …nancial bubbles that occurred as the crisis events unfolded.
Prior to the subprime crisis and following the collapse in dot.com stocks in 2000-2001, the housing market in many states of the US sustained rapid increases in valuations fueled by a period of low interest rates, large foreign capital in ‡ows, and high-risk lending practices of …nancial institutions. In the resulting boom, home ownership in the US increased to 69.2% in 2004 from 64% in 1994 (Callis and Cavanaugh, 2007) and nominal house prices increased by more than 180% over the period 1997-2006 (Panel 2 in Fig. 1 ). Household debt, as a percentage of disposable income, increased from 77% to 127% over the period 1990 -2007 (Economist, November 22, 2008 . At the same time, the MBS market, derived from residential mortgages, mushroomed, and major banks and …nancial institutions around the world invested in securities that were ultimately founded on the U.S. housing market. For example, the nominal outstanding amount of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) increased by more than 80% The concatenation of events that occured after the housing market peaked in 2005 and went into decline, followed by the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent repercussions on …nancial institutions over [2007] [2008] and …nally the impact on world trade and real economic activity, is now well known. Securities backed by subprime mortgages lost most of their value, investors lost con…dence, and liquidity dried up as money ‡owed to assets which appeared to have inherently lower risk, such as Treasury bonds, and to other assets like commodities, and currencies such as the U.S. dollar and the Japanese Yen (mainly through the unwinding of the carry trade industry), generating a so-called ‡ight-to-quality. In consequence, commodity prices soared, some currencies like the U.S. dollar appreciated, while others like the British pound rapidly declined. As the crisis deepened, stock markets around the world fell, and commercial banks, mortgage lenders and insurance companies failed. Consumption and investment expenditures dropped, many OECD economies went into serious recession, export driven economies in Asia sustained double digit percentage declines in exports, growth slowed signi…cantly in China, and world trade declined. Concomitant with these real economic e¤ects, global demand for commodities declined and commodity prices fell.
In a recent study, CFG (2008a) proposed a model which seeks to explain the main features of this sequence of complex interlinked …nancial crises. The CFG model links together global …nancial asset scarcity, global imbalances, the real estate bubble, the subprime crisis, and the commodity bubble in a general equilibrium macroeconomic environment without monetary factors. The model is based on CFG (2008b) and assumes that the economy has two countries (U and M ) and features two goods (X and Z). A key part of the CFG framework is a sequence of hypotheses involving successive bubble creations and collapses, which we brie ‡y review as follows.
Country U is interpreted as the U.S. and country M as the emerging market economies and commodity producers. Good X is a non-storable good, a fraction of which can be capitalized, and is produced by both countries. Good Z is a storable commodity and is produced only by country M . A presumption in the model is that there exists a global imbalance at period t 0 . The imbalance can be interpreted as arising from continuing capital ‡ows from emerging markets to the U.S. as the U.S. runs a growing trade de…cit with emergent economies, which in turn rely more heavily on export driven growth.
In order to allow country U to have both a large current account de…cit and low interest rates, a fundamental assumption that CFG makes is that a bubble developed initially in country U: In practical terms, this may be viewed as a bubble in the equity, housing and mortgage markets in the U.S., the latter providing …nancial assets that o¤er su¢ cient rewards to be attractive to the rest of the world. Another fundamental assumption is that the bubble bursts at t = 0, leaving investors (both locals and foreigners) to look for alternative stores of value. In the …rst stage, a ‡ight-to-quality reaction migrates the bubble to "good"assets and so the price of commodities (notably, Z) jumps, which results in a signi…cant wealth transfer from U to M .
In the second stage, under the assumption that the …nancial asset crisis and wealth transfer precipitates a severe growth slowdown, the excess demand for the "good" asset is destroyed, leading to a decrease in inventory of the good Z, and the bubble in commodity prices collapses. Accordingly, this model can describe events in which asset bubbles emerged and subsequently collapsed creating a sequence of bubble e¤ects in one market after another. When the real estate bubble crashed and the value of MBS securities fell substantially, liquidity ‡owed into other markets creating bubbles in commodities and oil markets as investors transferred …nancial assets. The deepening …nancial crisis then sharply slowed down economic growth, which in turn destroyed the commodity bubbles. Obviously, this story makes strong predictions concerning the timing of the origination and the collapse of various bubble phenomena in di¤erent markets. To evaluate the evidence in support of such interpretations of the events, consistent date stamping of those events is critical.
Econometric Dating of the Timeline
Bubbles can be de…nitively identi…ed only in hindsight after a market correction The key idea of PWY is simple to implement and relies on recursively calculated rightsided unit root tests to assess evidence for mildly explosive behavior in the data. In particular, for time series fX t g n t=1 , we apply standard unit root tests (such as the coe¢ cient test or the Dickey-Fuller t test) with usual unit root asymptotics under the null against the alternative of an explosive or mildly explosive root. The test is a right-sided test and therefore di¤ers from the usual left-sided tests for stationarity. Contrary to the quotation that heads this section, it is possible by means of these tests to identify the emergence of mildly explosive behavior as it occurs, thereby presaging bubble conditions. It is not necessary to wait for a market correction to identify bubble conditions in hindsight.
More speci…cally, we estimate the following autoregressive speci…cation by recursive least squares
allowing for the fact that the iid assumption may be relaxed with the usual (possibly semiparametric) adjustments to the tests. The null hypothesis is H 0 : = 1 and the right-tailed alternative hypothesis is H 1 : > 1; which allows for mildly explosive autoregressions with = 1 + c=k n ; where k n ! 1 and k n =n ! 0:
The 
where^ is the least squares estimate of based on the …rst = [nr] observations,^ 2 is the corresponding estimate of 2 ; andX j 1 = X j 1 1 P j=1 X j 1 : Obviously, DF 1 and DF t 1 correspond to the full sample test statistics. Under the null hypothesis of pure unit root dynamics and using standard weak convergence methods (Phillips, 1987), we have the following limit theory as = [nr] ! 1 for all r 2 [r 0 ; 1]
where W is standard Brownian motion and f W (r) = W (r) R 1 0 W is demeaned Brownian motion.
If Model (10) is the true data generating process for all t, then recursive regressions are unnecessary. In this case, a right-sided unit root test based on the full sample is able to distinguish a unit root null from an explosive alternative. In practice, of course, empirical bubble characteristics are much more complicated than model (10) and involve some regime change(s) between unit root (martingale) behavior with = 1 and mildly explosive behavior with > 1 and potential re-initialization as market temperature shifts from normal to exuberant sentiment and back again. A distinguishing empirical feature of bubble behavior is that market correction typically occurs as sentiment reverts back and mildly explosive behavior collapses.
A model to capture this type of reversion was …rst constructed by Evans (1991) who argued that conventional unit root tests had little power in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles generated in this manner. As shown in Phillips and Yu (2009), such a model which mixes a unit root process with a collapsed explosive process actually behaves like a unit root process over the full sample (in fact, with some bias toward stationarity as explained below), thereby invalidating the standard unit root test as a discriminating criterion when it is applied to the full sample.
To …nd evidence for the presence of a bubble in the full sample, PWY (2009) 
This dating rule for^ f requires that the duration of the bubble is nonnegligible -at least a small in…nity as measured by log n, so that episodes of smaller order than log n are not considered signi…cant in the dating algorithm for f : This requirement helps to reduce the type I error in the unit root test without a¤ecting the consistency property of the estimator.
The consistent estimation of r e and r f requires a slow divergence rate of critical values.
For practical implementation, we set the critical value sequences n cv n ; cv Under the mildly explosive bubble model,
Phillips and Yu (2009) showed thatr e p ! r e andr f p ! r f under some general regularity conditions. Model (15) mixes together two processes, a unit root process and a mildly explosive process with a root above 1 taking the form n = 1 + c n . This type of mildly explosive process over e t f was originally proposed and analyzed by PM (2007a PM ( , 2007b . However, the above system is more complex because it involves regime switches from unit root to mildly explosive behavior at e and from the mildly explosive root back to a unit root at f . At f , the switch also involves a re-initialization of the process and X t collapses to X f ; corresponding to a bubble collapse back to fundamental values prevailing prior to the emergence of the bubble.
We may, for instance, set X f = X e + X for some O p (1) random quantity X ; so that X f is within an O p (1) realization of the pre-bubble value of X t :
Under this model speci…cation (15), Phillips and Yu (2009) showed that when = [nr] 2
and
Hence, provided cv n goes to in…nity at a slower rate than n 1 and cv df n (r) goes to in…nity at a slower rate than n 1 =2 , DF r and DF t r both consistently estimate r e . Moreover, when
Hence, DF r and DF t r both consistently estimate r f . Importantly, (16) diverges to negative in…nity, so it is apparent that in the post bubble period > f the autoregressive coe¢ cient n ( ) is biased downwards, which in this case means biased towards stationarity. This bias is explained by the fact that the collapse of the bubble produces a mean reverting e¤ect in the data, which manifests in the limit theory as a slight bias towards stationarity in the estimated unit root.
We now provide some heuristic discussion about the capacity of these forward recursive regression tests to capture the timeline of bubble activity. The tests have discriminatory power because they are sensitive to the changes that occur when a process undergoes a change from a unit root to a mildly explosive root or vice versa. This sensitivity is much greater than in left-sided unit root tests against stationary alternatives, due to the downward bias and long left tail in the distribution of the autoregressive coe¢ cient in unit root and near stationary cases.
By contrast, as is apparent ex post in the data when there has been a bubble, the trajectories implied by unit root and mildly explosive processes di¤er in important ways. Although a unit root process can generate successive upward movements, these movements still have a random wandering quality unlike those of a stochastically explosive process where there is a distinct nonlinearity in movement and little bias in the estimation of the autoregressive coe¢ cient.
Forward recursive regressions are sensitive to the changes implied by this nonlinearity. When data from the explosive (bubble) period are included in estimating the autoregressive coe¢ -cient, these observations quickly in ‡uence the estimate and its asymptotic behavior due to the dominating e¤ect of the signal from mildly explosive data. This di¤erence in signal between the two periods provides identifying information and explains why the two test procedures consistently estimate the origination date. When the bubble bursts and the system switches back to unit root behavior, the signal from the explosive period continues to dominate that of unit root period. This domination, which at this point is e¤ectively a domination by initial conditions, is analogous to the domination by distant initializations that can occur in unit root limit theory, as shown recently by Phillips and Magdalinos (2009) . More than this, the crash and re-initialization give the appearance in the data of a form of mean reversion to an earlier state, so that the estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient is smaller than unity and the classical unit root test statistics diverge to minus in…nity, as shown in (16) and (17) above.
Initialization
To improve the power of the PWY procedure, we modify the methods by selecting the initial condition based on the Schwarz (1978) BIC criterion. In PWY, the initial observation in each recursive regression was …xed to the …rst observation of the full sample. While this choice is convenient, when time series mix a non-explosive regime with an explosive regime, a more powerful test is obtained if the recursive statistics are calculated using sample data from a single regime for bubble detection. This observation motivates us to use the data to choose the initialization. The method follows an approach to endogenize initialization in time series regression that was suggested in Phillips (1996) .
Suppose an origination date^ e has been identi…ed by the procedure of PWY 2 . Let n min be the number of observations in a base sample of the observations fX e n min +1 ; : : : ; X e g:
The base sample may be constructed by taking some percentage of the sample before^ e : In our applications below we use 10%: For the base sample, we compare the BIC value of two competing models -a unit root model and an autoregressive model. If the BIC value of the unit root model is smaller and the point estimate of is larger than 1, we reset the initial condition to e n min + 1. Otherwise, we expand the base sample to fX e n min ; : : : ; X e g, that is another observation is added to the beginning of the sample. Based on the new sample, we again compare the BIC value of the competing models. If the BIC value of the unit root model is smaller and the point estimate of is larger than 1, we reset the initial condition to e n min . This exercise is repeated until the BIC value of the unit root model is smaller.
If the sample eventually becomes fX 1 ; : : : ; X e g and the BIC value of the unit root model is still larger, we set the initial condition to t = 1; which is the same as that used in PWY. If the initialization emerging from this procedure is^ 0 ; then the recursive testing methodology of PYW is applied from^ 0 . With this initialization, denote the estimate of the origination datê e (^ 0 ) and the estimate of the collapse date^ f (^ 0 ). Obviously,^ e (1) =^ e and^ f (1) =^ f . However, if^ 0 > 1, it is possible that^ e (^ 0 ) 6 =^ e and^ f (^ 0 ) 6 =^ f . In general it is expected that^ e (^ 0 ) ^ e since the backward recursion to locate the initialization^ 0 begins from^ e :
Assume the sample is X e n min n k +1 ; : : : ; X e . The BIC value of the unit root model is ln P e t= e n min n k
whereas the BIC value of the autogression is ln 0 B @ P e t= e n min n k
where X = 1 n min +n k P e t= e n min n k +1 X t , b and b are the OLS estimators of and from the autoregressive model
It is known that when the criterion is applied in this way BIC can consistently (i.e. almost surely as n ! 1) distinguish a unit root model from a stationary model without specifying transient dynamics (see Phillips, 2008) . Using similar methods it can be shown that BIC consistently distinguishes a unit root model from a model with an explosive root. In essence, the use of BIC to select the initialization is equivalent to the use of BIC to choose a break point, although in the present case it is not necessary to speci…cy transient behavior.
Data
Two datasets are studied in the empirical work reported here. The primary data constitute Table 1 reports some summary descriptive statistics for these seven time series, including sample size, sample frequency, sample minimum, date of the minimum, sample maximum, date of the maximum, as well as the coe¢ cient statistic (DF 1 ) and DF-t statistic (DF t 1 ) based on the entire sample. The real Nasdaq index reached its maximum of 27. 
Empirical Results
Three phases have been identi…ed in connection with the subprime crisis. According to CFG (2008a), each phase involves a speci…c hypothesis that concerns related bubble activity. In the …rst phase (A), before the subprime crisis publicly erupted, bubbles had emerged and burst in the stock market, the housing market, and mortgage market. These bubbles all played a role in global imbalances. In particular, three hypotheses are in order.
Hypothesis A1: A bubble originated and collapsed in the stock market prior to the emergence of the subprime crisis. During the second phase (B), the subprime crisis broke and funds ‡owed selectively to assets in other markets with lower perceived risk. In consequence, bubbles emerged in certain commodity and foreign exchange markets and credit risk perceptions shot up, leading to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis B1: Bubbles originated in certain commodity price markets and exchange rates following the eruption of the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis B2: Bubbles originated in the bond market as the subprime crisis unfolded.
In the third phrase (C), as perceptions increased that there would be a potentially serious impact of the …nancial crisis on real economic activity in the U.S and globally, the …nancial bubbles in commodity prices and the bond market collapsed. Correspondingly, we have another hypothesis:
Hypothesis C: Bubbles that had arisen in commodity prices and the bond market collapsed.
We now report and discuss the empirical results. First, we check for statistical evidence of the presence of bubble(s) in each of the time series based on the recursively calculated sup statistics max DF r and max DF t r . Table 2 reports critical values for these two statistics obtained by simulation for the two sample sizes, 100 and 500. The critical values for max DF t r are nearly identical to those reported in PWY. The critical values for max DF r are about twice as large as those for max DF t r . This is not surprising as the critical values for the conventional unit root statistic DF r are about twice as large as those for DF t r (see, for example, Fuller, 2000) . The …rst two rows in Table 3 report values for the two statistics based on the seven time series with 0 = 0:1. All cases show overwhelming evidence for the presence of bubbles. The p-values are all less than 1% for data other than the crude oil price. For the crude oil price, the p-value is between 1% and 5%. Judging from the magnitude of the two statistics, the bubble characteristics are strongest in the Nasdaq, House prices and Baa. 
Nov/00 June/07 July/07 Aug/08 July/08 Dec/4/08 NA Next we estimate the origination and collapse dates, e and f and report these in the last two rows in Table 3 . Table 4 shows the di¤erence between b e (^ 0 ) and b f (^ 0 ), the estimates based on the endogenized initialization, and b e (1) and b f (1), the estimates based on the initialization proposed by PWY. The two sets of estimates turn out to be the same for the Nasdaq, Oil, Plantinum and Baa series. But they di¤er by 1-4 periods for Home prices, ABCP and Pound/USD (shown in bold face in Table 4 ). When they are di¤erent, b e (^ 0 ) is always smaller, suggesting that the endogenized initialization indeed gives an earlier warning. 1-3 plot b e (^ 0 ) and b f (^ 0 ), together with the time series data. In all of these cases, we clearly identify an explosive subperiod in the data.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the estimates and Figs. 1-3 and 5-11. First, the estimated origination and collapse dates seem to cover a subperiod of signi…cant price run-up in each of the time series. Second, the estimated origination dates are not the same as the apparent beginning of these run-up periods. This may be because a unit root process as well as processes with very mildly explosive roots that are closer to unity than an O n 1 neighborhood can also generate mild run-ups but the latter are indistinguishable from a unit root root process. The present tests have substantial discriminatory power for mildly explosive roots beyond those of O n 1 neighborhoods and are consistent against such alternatives.
Third, both statistics DF r and DF t r lead to the same or very similar dating estimates, except for house prices, which are discussed below.
Some speci…c conclusions can be drawn for the individual time series and these are summarized below.
1. For the Nasdaq series, a very signi…cant bubble is found by both DF r and DF t r statistics over June 1995 to Oct 2000. The estimates b e and b f are identical to those found in PWY, although a di¤erent statistic (the augmented Dickey-Fuller test) was employed there, the data sources (both for the index and the de ‡ator) di¤er, and the sample period is shorter in PWY. Interestingly, no bubble is found over the more recent period even though there was some run up in prices before the subprime crisis. Note that the Nasdaq bubble collapsed several years prior to the subprime crisis. So the results are entirely consistent with hypothesis A1. 5. For Platinum prices, the recursions of DF r and DF t r both include two periods (one at the beginning of the sample and the other in the middle of the sample) where the statistics exceed the critical values. However, the durations are so short so that the log(n) separating rule for minimum bubble duration suggests that these should be interpreted as short-lived run-ups not bubbles. However, a signi…cant bubble is found by both DF r and DF migrated from the equity market (in particular the Nasdaq index), …rst to the housing market, and next to the mortgage market before the subprime crisis. After the subprime crisis, the bubbles selectively moved to certain goods in commodity markets and certain currencies in the foreign exchange market.
To assess whether or not bubble characteristics were a generic or speci…c feature in commodity and foreign exchange markets during the …nancial crisis, we applied the methods more broadly to many series in a secondary dataset. To preserve space, we present only the summary empirical results in Table 4 without plotting the recursive test statistics.
Although it is clear from the empirical results obtained earlier that funds moved across markets during the crisis period for ‡ight-to-quality and ‡ight-to-liquidity reasons, the results in Table 4 suggest that investors were selective in transferring assets. For example, in the commodity market, we identify a bubble in heating oil prices, with similar origination and collapsing dates as those for crude oil prices. However, we …nd no evidence of bubbles in co¤ee, cotton, sugar, and feeder cattle prices. In the foreign exchange market, we locate a bubble in the Cnd/USD exchange rate, which originated on September 21, 2007 and burst on November 23, 2007 . Interestingly, the origination date is about one year earlier than that in the Pound/USD exchange rate. However, no bubble is found in the Euro/USD exchange rate. Although the value of the max DF r statistic is marginally higher than the corresponding critical value for Cocoa and the Yen/USD rate, detailed analysis of the recursive calculations of the test statistic shows that the run-ups only lasted for a couple of periods and therefore do not survive the log(n) separating rule for minimum bubble duration. 
Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical study of the bubble characteristics in several key …nancial variables over an historical time period that includes the subprime crisis and its sequel, including global e¤ects. The econometric methods employed are based on recursive regression, rightsided unit root tests and a newly developed dating technology and associated limit theory from Phillips and Yu (2009). These methods enable us to track the timeline of the crisis in terms of the individual series by empirically dating the origination and collapse of each of the bubbles.
The dates are matched against the onset date for the subprime crisis as well as a speci…c sequential hypothesis concerning bubble migrations that are predicted in the theoretical model proposed by CFG (2008a). Our estimates suggest that bubbles migrated from the equity market to the housing market and on to the subprime mortgage derivative market before the crisis broke. After the crisis erupted into the public arena, the pricing bubbles migrated to selected commodity markets and, in some cases, the foreign exchange market, suggesting a ‡ight-to-quality or perceived safe haven phenomena. All these bubbles collapsed as the …nancial crisis impacted real economic activity. The estimated sequence of the bubble migration phenomenon is broadly consistent with the predictions of CFG (2008a).
The methods used here may also be used to provide early warning diagnostics for market exuberance as they provide consistent tests for mildly explosive behavior. Such diagnostics may assist policy makers in framing early monetary policy responses or other regulatory actions or interventions to combat speculative bubbles in …nancial markets.
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